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' n April 26, 2002, the Supreme Court of Canada
delivered its anticipated decision, Bell ExpressVu Limited Part-
nership v. Rex. 2 Bell ExpressVu considered the role of sec-
tion 9(1 )(c) of Canada's Radiocommunication Act 3 to deter-
mine whether it prevents Canadians from decrypting satel-
lite programming that originates with American broadcast-
ers.4 While some lower courts had previously interpreted
section 9(l)(c) narrowly by limiting the liability of those
engaged in such decryption, I the Supreme Court inter-
preted the section broadly to prevent the piracy of Ameri-
can satellite signals. 6 This interpretation affects the hun-
dreds of thousands of Canadians owningAmerican satellite
systems, as well as the businesses that provide them.As a
result, Bell ExpressVu has wide implications.7
This Article first describes satellite technology and
the process by which Canadians access American satellite
broadcasts. It then examines the competing issues of pres-
ervation of Canadian business and culture, versus the free-
dom of expression as set forth in section 2(b) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter "Char-
ter"). Next, the Article considers case law preceding Bell
ExpressVu, and presents an examination of the findings of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Bell ExpressVu. The Article
will then argue that the Supreme Court incorrectly found
that there existed no ambiguity in the various interpre-
tations of section 9(l)(c), and that its decision derives
from the consideration of broad policy factors affecting sat-
ellite signal piracy in general. Finally, the Article considers
arguments for a constitutional challenge to the Supreme
Court's interpretation based on the Charter.8
The use of satellite technology to broadcast televi-
sion programming has emerged as a viable alternative to
broadcasting via over-the-air and cable signals. ' Histori-
cally, broadcasting television signals over long distances has
proven difficult. 0 Radio signals, for example, operate at
relatively low frequencies and reflect off the Earth's ion-
osphere, thereby allowing for the transmission of radio
broadcasts over long distances. I Television signals, on the
other hand, require higher frequencies that do not reflect
off of the Earth's ionosphere. 12 The use of satellite tech-
nology, however, makes possible the timely transmission of
television signals.
Satellite television technology employs geosynchro-
nous satellites orbiting the Earth once every 24 hours at a
distance of 22,300 miles. "3 Positioned above the equator,
the satellites do not change position relative to the Earth
and, as a result, ground transmitters and receivers do not
require repositioning once aimed at the satellite. 14 More
importantly, the use of satellites enables the transmission
of live broadcasts over great distances, delayed only by the
time the signal takes to travel at the speed of light. "5
The transmission of satellite communication begins
with the "uplink"-the transmission of information from
an originating ground station to the satellite. 6 The satel-
lite then retransmits the information back to a receiver on
the ground-the "downlink." " The satellite's orientation
towards the ground establishes a physical area capable of
receiving the satellite's signal-the satellite's "footprint." 8
Viewers residing within the footprint can then capture the
signal and view satellite programming. 19 Capturing a satel-
lite signal, however, requires that a satellite customer pos-
sess three components-a receiving dish, a receiver, and a
"smart card." 20 First, a receiving dish captures the signal
redirected by the satellite, 21 at which point the second
component, a receiver,"receives" the digitized signal.22 The
third necessary component, a "smart card," contains a com-
puter chip able to decrypt the encrypted signal, allowing
the customer to view the programming for which he or she
has paid.23 Satellite broadcasters control a customer's abil-
ity to decrypt satellite signals by retaining the ability to acti-
vate the smart card remotely upon payment of a monthly
fee. 24
Bell ExpressVu and StarChoice, the two satellite
broadcasters currently licensed to provide programming in
Canada 21 through the Canadian Radio-television and Tele-
communications Commission (hereinafter "CRTC"), are
subject to the relevant rules regarding Canadian program-
ming requirements.
The reception of broadcasts from American sat-
ellites by circumventing program-content regulations con-
tinues to pose a major problem to the current licensing
regime in Canada. Despite encrypted broadcast signals,
Canadian purchasers of satellite equipment remain capable
of deciphering American broadcasting signals in order to
enjoyAmerican programming in the comfort of their homes
in Canada. That is, Canadians can access American satellite
broadcasting in either of two ways: by use of a false mailing
address or by circumventing the encryption technology.
A Canadian purchaser of American satellite equip-
ment can acquire an American mailing address and submit
payments using that address.2 6 Under this method,Ameri-
can satellite broadcasters treat the Canadian receiver of
signals as a legal American purchaser, and remotely activate
the customer's smart card-allowing for decryption of the
satellite broadcast.2 7 In such cases, the Canadian resident
pays the identical amount for the programming package as
does an American resident. Thus, the satellite broadcaster
treats the Canadian resident as if he or she were a regular
American customer.
Employing encryption circumvention technology
provides an additional method for
accessing American satellite program-
ming from Canada. Under this method,
viewers download decryption software
available on the Internet and transfer
the software code directly onto the
smart card. In other words, program-
mers "hack" the satellite smart card
rather than paying an American satellite
provider for authorization to unscram-
ble the satellite signals.' These "pirate"
cards can be purchased in Canada from
satellite dealers and reprogrammed peri-
odically to stay ahead of broadcaster changes to the encryp-
tion codes. 29 When a satellite broadcaster changes the
encryption code and renders a programmed smart card
useless, consumers can simply hire a programmer to repro-
gram their smart cards for a minimal fee.
The advent of technology allowing for Canadians
to access international satellite broadcasts has, in turn, cre-
ated ideological tensions between those individuals wishing
to protect Canadian business and culture, and those advo-
cating freedom of expression.
The advent of satellite broadcasting technology has
created serious cultural and political implications in Canada.
The Broadcasting Act 30 recognizes that a Canadian broad-
casting regime remains "essential to the maintenance and
enhancement of national identity and cultural sovereignty" 3
and that it serves to "safeguard, enrich and strengthen the
cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada:' 
32
The cultural sector represents an important part of the
Canadian economy, contributing $24 billion towards the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1996-97.3" The Cana-
dian cultural sector, moreover, employs 710,000 individuals. 3
Given these statistics, the government recognizes that pro-
tecting the Canadian broadcast industry not only preserves
the national identity of the Canadian people, but it also
ensures continued growth of the Canadian economy.
The Broadcasting Act attempts to protect Canadian
culture by prescribing minimum limits of Canadian content
that broadcasters must televise. The Broadcasting Act gives
the CRTC the power to enact regulations regarding both
the definition of "Canadian" programming as well as the
proportion of time that broadcasters must devote to Cana-
dian programming.3" Under the relevant regulations, public
and private broadcasters must devote no less than sixty
percent of their total broadcast time to Canadian program-
ming in a given year. 3 6 Furthermore, public broadcasters
must ensure that sixty percent of their evening broadcast
period is devoted to Canadian programming; private broad-
casters must maintain a fifty percent quota of Canadian
programming during evening broadcasts. "7 To qualify as
Canadian content, the program in question must meet
strict requirements that include using a Canadian producer,'8
achieving at least six points on the CRTC scale for deter-
mining key creative functions, 39 and requiring payment of
seventy-five percent of the service costs to Canadians. 40
Such requirements demonstrate the importance placed by
the Canadian government on the protection of Canadian
identity. Canadian content rules further encourage the
Canadian broadcasting sector to produce domestic pro-
gramming because of the technical impediments to broad-
casting over long distances.
While Canadians living near the American border
have historically received programming spilling over from
the United States, those living farther from the border had
no choice but to view Canadian stations, which offered
solely programming subject to Canadian content rules. 4
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With cable television services currently available to the
majority of Canadian viewers, 42 orders drafted by the
CRTC now require both that certain Canadian channels
receive priority in, and that certain competing American
broadcasts be excluded from, cable television programming
packages.43 The advent of direct to home satellite tech-
nology further prompted the CRTC to seek control of
Canadian content by limiting the number of satellite broad-
cast providers in Canada as well as by regulating content
available to consumers. 44 Canadians dissatisfied with the
choices offered by Canadian cable and satellite retailers,
however, can take advantage of Canada's proximity to the
United States and receiveAmerican satellite broadcasts. By
purchasing a satellite dish intended for use in the United
States and taking advantage of the large footprint American
satellites leave on Canadian territory, Canadian consumers
can bypass Canadian content regulations by simply orient-
ing their backyard dishes toward American satellites and
decrypting the signals received. This allows Canadians to
enjoyAmerican broadcasts unaffected by Canadian content
regulations.
Freedom of Expression
The regulatory regime imposed by Canadian legis-
lation and the CRTC contradicts the Charter-protected fun-
damental freedom of expression. 41 Canada recognized the
importance of the freedom of expression even before the
adoption of the Charter. In Boucher v. The King, 46 Justice
Rand found that "[f]reedom in thought and speech and dis-
agreement in ideas and beliefs, on every conceivable sub-
ject, are of the essence of our life:' 47 Justice Rand also
spoke strongly about expression in Switzman v. Elbling, 48
finding that "public opinion ... demands the condition of
a virtually unobstructed access to and diffusion of ideas'" 49
Courts continued their strong protection of expression
rights after the adoption of the Charter, finding that its pro-
tection exceeded political or commercial expression. As
stated by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Lebel,"lt is one
of the fundamental concepts that has formed the basis for
the historical development of the political, social and edu-
cational institutions of western society." "
In considering the freedom of expression, the
Supreme Court of Canada has recognized three broad
underlying rationales.5' The Court found that: "(I) seek-
ing and attaining the truth is an inherently good activity;
(2) participation in social and political decision-making is to
be fostered and encouraged; and (3) the diversity in forms
of individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing ought to
be cultivated in an essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming,
environment not only for the sake of those who convey a
meaning, but also for the sake of those to whom it is con-
veyed." 52 The Court also recognized that section 2(b) of
the Charter protects choice of language:"language is so inti-
mately related to the form and content of expression that
there cannot be true freedom of expression by means
of language if one is prohibited from using the language
of one's choice. Language is not merely a means or
medium of expression; it colours the content and meaning
of expression" " Many Canadians, however, do not enjoy
the freedom to receive broadcasting in the language of
their choice.
Currently, subscribers to Canadian satellite ser-
vices have no access to many cultural and religious pro-
grams available through American satellite providers. While
DirecTV offers various packages that include such program-
ming, " Canada's small market " for religious and third-
language-i.e., non-English and non-French-programming
deprives cultural minorities in Canada access to program-
ming relevant to their lives. For example, while Canadian
satellite services do not broadcast any Spanish language
channels, American satellite services feature many Spanish
channels catering to the United States' Hispanic popula-
tion. 6 Thus, Latino Canadians currently enjoy only mini-
mal access to programming in their native tongue. More-
over, Canadian satellite programming affords few options
for non-Christian Canadians, whereas American broadcast-
ers offer many more channels for the benefit non-Chris-
tian Americans. "7 As a result, minority segments of the
population argue that freedom of expression protects their
right to access cultural and religious programming specific
to their heritage. These advocates of American satellite
broadcasting also argue that prohibiting American satellite
broadcasts undermines the broad principles that underlie
the freedom of expression. 58 Furthermore, Canada has
never banned the reception of foreign signals receivable on
short-wave radio, via rooftop antennae for televisions, or
from Internet websites located abroad.5 9 The prohibition
on foreign satellite signal reception has even been com-
pared to the prohibition of Western radio and television
signals in cold-war Russia.60 With the Canadian regulatory
regime currently standing at odds with those advocating
the free flow of information, an amicable resolution balanc-
ing the interests of both sides must be achieved.
Section 9(I)(c) of the Radiocommunication Act pro-
vides that "no person shall decode an encrypted subscrip-
tion programming signal or encrypted network feed oth-
erwise than under and in accordance with an authoriza-
tion from the lawful distributor of the signal or feed." 6
While a practical difference in the two methods of acquir-
ing and decrypting signals from American satellite broad-
casters exists (establishing a U.S. address as opposed to
hacking the smart card), section 9(l)(c) does not differen-
tiate between the two methods, but instead treats both
identically. 62 Section 18(l)(c), meanwhile, allows anyone
"[holding] a licence to carry on a broadcasting undertaking
issued by the [CRTC] under the Broadcasting Act" to sue
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a person involved in conduct prohibited by section 9(l)(c)
for damages. 63 Ultimately, the various interpretations of
section 9(l)(c) by Canadian courts have created the most
controversy.
Absolute Prohibition
The first line of cases interpreting section 9(l)(c)
of the Radiocommunication Act held that, absent consent of
a licensed broadcaster, section 9(l)(c) absolutely prohibits
the decoding of encrypted broadcast signals-regardless
of whether the signals originated with a licensed Canadian
broadcaster or an unlicensed American broadcaster." In
terms of the effect achieved by this interpretation, the first
line of cases established a broad interpretation of section
9(l)(c). Since Canadians viewing American broadcasts do
not have the consent of a licensed broadcaster, and since the
CRTC does not license American broadcasters to broad-
cast in Canada, the reception and decoding of American
programming must be prohibited.
In R. v. Knibb, 65 the Alberta Provincial Court consid-
ered the Broadcasting Act's policy implication in relation to
the Radiocommunication Act:
It is clear from the stated policy of the Broadcast-
ing Act that there is only one broadcast system in
Canada that is to be regulated by a single entity.
Programs that are not a part of the Canadian
Broadcasting system, e.g., encrypted satellite signals
from outside Canada that are not distributed by
a lawful distributor in Canada are not capable of
regulation in the normal sense, that is by regula-
tion of the distributor. This of course means that
there can be no regulation in the context of the
policy set out in s. 3 of the Broadcasting Act. It is
impossible to prevent the transmission of satellite
signals emanating from outside Canada because it
is impossible to block such signals once transmit-
ted. The regulation of encrypted signals that are
not or do not become part of the Canadian Broad-
casting system can only occur by regulation of the
recipient. That is, to prohibit such reception except
in circumstances where the signal is subject to
the regulated control of the Canadian Broadcasting
system, i.e. through a lawful distributor. 66
The Court found the argument that prohibiting the decryp-
tion of signals applying only to Canadian providers "does
not consider the fact that such an approach would allow
unregulated broadcasting that would surely harm the eco-
nomic interests of the lawful distributors in Canada. The
fact that the harm in this sense is more subtle than the
direct harm referred to by Defence counsel does not make
it any less harmful." 67 On appeal, 68 however, the Alberta
Court of Queen's Bench acknowledged evidence indicating
that lawful Canadian distributors did exist for some of
the programming available from American broadcasters. 69
Based on this evidence, the appellate Court found that
section 9(l)(c) incorporated an absolute prohibition
against the decoding of encrypted subscription program
signals unless they emanated from a lawful Canadian dis-
tributor in Canada that authorized their decoding. 71
Following the Alberta Provincial Court's line of rea-
soning, the Manitoba Provincial Court found that section
9( I)(c) absolutely prohibited the decryption of programming
signals originating in the United States in R. v. Open Sky.71
The Court reasoned that allowing unauthorized decryp-
tion would harm lawful distributors of similar programming
in Canada. 72 According to the Court,"[e]ven if the pro-
gramming had not been of the same type, the programming
would still not have received the regulatory approval from
the CRTC as there was no lawful distributor in Canada" 73
In R. v. Nil Norsat International,74 the Federal Court
of Appeal affirmed the trial court's recognition of an abso-
lute prohibition on the decryption of broadcast signals
originating in the United States. The Court found that "the
interpretation [of] paragraph 9(I)(c) of the Act is entirely
supported by the text of the provision and provides, as [the
Court] believe[s] it was intended, a measure of control in
Canada over the unfair competition which comes both from
internal and external sources and is inherent in the reception
and enjoyment of satellite services. "' Thus, the Federal Court
of Appeal adopted the prohibition on the decryption of
American satellite broadcasts. These particular courts, in
attempting to interpret the logical meaning of section
9(l)(c), relied heavily on the policy implications of their
decisions-e.g., the protection of Canadian culture and
business-and interpreted section 9(l)(c) so as to ensure
consistency therewith. Other courts, however, allowed
concerns regarding the protection of the freedom of
expression to weigh heavier on their decisions. Decisions
of these courts are examined below.
Legal Broadcaster
The second line of cases interpreting section 9(I)(c)
of the Radiocommunication Act held that the reception of for-
eign satellite broadcasts was prohibited only if a legal broad-
caster existed. In terms of the effect achieved by this inter-
pretation, the second line of cases established a narrow
interpretation of section 9(l)(c). In R. v. Love,76 the defen-
dant appealed to the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench his
conviction for modifying satellite decoders, which allowed
for the reception of foreign satellite broadcasts. 77 Despite
upholding the defendant's conviction on grounds that the
defendant decrypted signals available from lawful Canadian
distributors, the Court concluded that section 9(l)(c)
sought only to protect Canadian distributors. 78 Rejecting
arguments advocating absolute prohibition of all signals, the
Court found that Parliament had restricted the prohibi-
tion to signal decryption.79 With respect to the impact
of the prohibition on lawful distributors, justice Kennedy
explained that "[i]f the prohibition is to protect lawful dis-
tributors it would be difficult to speculate how the receipt
of signals from other sources not licensed in Canada could
impact upon the lawful distributor who themselves have no
entitlement to the signals" o Meanwhile, the Court inter-
preted the relevant provisions of the Radiocommunication
Act to be quasi-criminal in nature, and held that in such
cases, an accused was to be afforded the most favorable
interpretation of such provisions.8" That is, in this second
line of cases, the courts displayed a willingness to interpret
narrowly the imprecise provision in an attempt to protect
the defendants-as opposed to the broad interpretation
adopted in the first line of cases. Since Parliament did
not explicitly prohibit the interception of signals where
lawful distributors
in Canada do not
exist,"[i]t is there-
fore open to con-
dude that where




in R. v. Ere-
iser, 83 the Sas-
katchewan Court
of Queen's Bench
explicitly agreed with the Love decision. In its decision, the
Court added that, in order to qualify as a protected "sub-
scription programming signal" under the Radiocommunica-
tion Act, the broadcast signal "must be lawfully intended for
reception by the public in Canada and the public must also
be entitled to lawfully subscribe for it in Canada." 4 Follow-
ing this reasoning, section 9(1)(c) could not prohibit Cana-
dians from decrypting programming signals from American
satellites that originated in the United States since they
were not lawfully intended for Canadian reception. More-
over, in R. v. LeBlanc, 8s the Nova Scotia Supreme Court
adopted the Ereiser Court's reasoning concerning section
9(l)(c), reiterating the opinion that the section prohibits
the decryption of broadcast signals only when a lawful dis-
tributor in Canada existed.
Before Bell ExpressVu reached the Supreme Court
of Canada, the British Columbia Court of Appeal heard Bell
ExpressVu Limited v. Rex. 8 6 The Court of Appeal followed
the second line of cases, finding that the Radiocommunication
Act only protected the decryption of signals that originated
with a licensed Canadian distributor.
The Appellant in Bell ExpressVu was one of two dis-
tributors licensed by the CRTC to provide within Canada
direct-to-home ("DTH") satellite signals. 87 The Respon-
dent, a satellite equipment vendor, engaged in the sale of
equipment that allowed users to decode satellite signals
originating in the United States. " To execute its scheme,
the Respondent provided American mailing addresses to its
customers since American satellite distributors would not
authorize the reception of their signals by foreign sub-
scribers.89 The Respondent would then contact the Ameri-
can broadcasters on behalf of a customer and provide a
U.S. address and the customer's billing information. This
would satisfy the American satellite broadcaster's require-
ment that the customer live in the U.S.9"
The British Columbia Court of Appeal consid-
ered the divergent interpretations of section 9()(c) of
the Radiocommunication Act and found the section ambigu-
ous. Because the legislation bore penal consequences, the
Court advocated adoption of the narrow interpretation. 91













program signals that are not authorized by the
lawful distributor of the signal. "The signal" can
only refer to signals broadcast by lawful distribu-
tors who are licensed to authorize decoding of
that signal. "Lawful distributor" is defined in the
Radiocommunication Act to mean those who have
the lawful right in Canada to transmit the signal
and to authorize its decoding. If there is no lawful
distributor for an encrypted subscription program
signal in Canada, there can be no one licensed to
authorize its decoding. Decoding of such an unreg-
ulated signal cannot therefore be in breach of the
Radiocommunication Act. 11
The British Columbia Court of Appeal, however, followed
the decisions of Love, Ereiser, and LeBlanc for more than just
policy reasons. The Court of Appeal agreed with the notion
of protecting expression, and also found that, in order to be
invoked, section 9(l)(c) logically required the existence of
a licensed distributor.9 4 That is, the Court of Appeal inter-
preted section 9(1)(c)'s "the lawful distributor of the signal"
to mean that, in order to warrant protection, the signal
required broadcasting from a lawful distributor." This deci-
sion afforded those advocating a narrow interpretation of
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section 9(1 )(c) their strongest endorsement to date.
On December 4, 2001, the Supreme Court of
Canada heard Bell ExpressVu on appeal from the British
Columbia Court of Appeal.9 6 Using principles of statutory
interpretation, the Court found no ambiguity in section
9(1)(c). 9' Justice lacobucci, writing for the majority,
explained that section 9(1)(c), read in its "grammatical and
ordinary sense,' created an absolute prohibition with a lim-
ited exception. 98 Again, section 9(l) of the Radiocommuni-
cation Act provides:
No person shall
(c) decode an encrypted subscription programming
signal or encrypted network feed otherwise than under
and in accordance with authorization from the lawful
distributor of the signal or feed. 99
The Supreme Court realized that the British Columbia
Court of Appeal had based its interpretation of the section
on the use of the word "the" instead of the word "a". 10
Finding this interpretation incorrect, however, the Supreme
Court explained that:
[T]he definite articles are used in the exception
portion of s. 9(1)(c) in order to identify from
amongst the genus of signals captured by the pro-
hibition (any encrypted subscription programming
signal) that species of signals for which the rule
is "otherwise". Grammatically, then, the choice
of definite and indefinite articles essentially plays
out into the following rendition: No person shall
decode any (indefinite) encrypted subscription pro-
gramming signal unless, for the (definite) particular
signal that is decoded, the person has received
authorization from the (definite) lawful distributor.
Thus, as might happen, if no lawful distributor exists
to grant such authorization, the general prohibition
must remain in effect. 101
The Court also considered the prohibition on decrypting
satellite signals in a broader context, finding that a broader
interpretation of section 9(1)(c) remained consistent with
both the Broadcasting Act and the protection of Canadian
culture.' 02 It questioned the rationality of a narrower inter-
pretation, asking:"Why would Parliament provide for Cana-
dian ownership, Canadian production, Canadian content in
its broadcasting and then simply leave the door open for
unregulated, foreign broadcasting to come in and sweep all
of that aside? What purpose would have been served?" 103
The Supreme Court thus found that the context in which
the section exists was a determinative factor in its interpre-
tation.
The Supreme Court ultimately overruled the pre-
vious decisions supporting a narrow interpretation of sec-
tion 9(I)(c) for two reasons. First, the Court sided with
a policy rationale that advocated the protection of Cana-
dian culture and business. Second, the Court found that the
logical meaning of the section's wording required an abso-
lute prohibition of American satellite signals. In this deci-
sion, the Supreme Court determined how section 9(I)(c)
of the Radiocommunication Act is to be interpreted and
applied across Canada.
The inconsistent interpretations by Canadian courts
reveal, however, that ambiguity does in fact exist within
section 9(I)(c) of the Radiocommunication Act. While the
Bell ExpressVu decision concerned a defendant providing
U.S. mailing addresses to facilitate access to American satel-
lite programming via paid subscriptions, the true value of
the decision to Canadian satellite providers was actually in
stopping the hacking of smart cards. This practice of access-
ing American programming for free would have continued
unchecked had the Supreme Court recognized the ambigu-
ity in the section and interpreted the
section narrowly.
As discussed previously, many
Canadians who access American sat-
ellite programming, in order to avoid
paying American satellite providers for
authorization to decrypt their satellite
signals, hack their smart cards using a
decryption program. Individuals can
purchase these pirate cards in Canada
from satellite dealers and have them
configured to decode the American sig-
nals, thus giving Canadian customers
access to American channels and pay-per-view movies for no monthly charge.
The typical customer either pays a
programmer between ten and twenty
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Canadian dollars to configure his card, or instead simply
downloads a free hack program from the Internet. The
consumers in this market most adversely affect Canadian
satellite providers.
On the other hand, Canadian customers providing
a U.S. address pay subscription costs of up to U.S. $82.99, 04 and
even more when they subscribe to pay-per-view movies and
events. Bell ExpressVu generally priced programming pack-
ages competitively between Canadian $10.95 and $74.95,
but such packages can also cost more. 105 Bell's program-
ming packages, while priced in Canadian dollars, also have
the advantages of containing Canadian channels and pro-
gramming. 106 As a result, when forced to choose between
subscribing to American or Canadian satellite services,
many Canadians would likely choose Canadian satellite ser-
vices.
The true issue in the satellite wars remains the use
of "pirate" access cards, through which Canadians pay no
monthly subscription fee to access all channels available
on the American service. If the Supreme Court had fol-
lowed the British Columbia Court of Appeal's interpreta-
tion of section 9(I)(c) of the Radiocommunication Act, not
only would subscribing to American satellite services have
become legal, but so would have the use of pirate cards. As
it stands, section 9(l)(c) is an all-or-nothing provision with
respect to American satellite signals-if the section did not
apply to foreign signals, Canadians would have been able
to use technological means to decryptAmerican signals for
free. Requiring Canadian viewers to pay the full price for
a subscription to American services would enable Cana-
dian satellite providers to compete. Canadian companies
cannot, however, compete with a free service-no matter
how low the fees-since decryption creates the possibility
of essentially free access to American satellite service. It
is this practice of accessingAmerican satellite programming
for free that truly threatens Canadian business and cul-
ture. The all-or-nothing nature of the Radiocommunication
Act, coupled with the fact that section 9(I)(c) is not broken
down into two distinct sections to recognize the two dif-
ferent ways of accessing foreign signals, forced the Supreme
Court to overturn the British Columbia Court of Appeal
in order to stop the practice of hacking smart cards.
In so doing, however, the Supreme Court of Canada
relieved the Canadian Parliament of its responsibility to
clarify this situation. Parliament could not have predicted
the technological issues that arose in Bell ExpressVu at the
time it drafted the Radiocommunication Act. Yet it is Par-
liament that bears the burden of dealing with the issues
created by modern technology. 107 The Supreme Court
allowed the fact that section 9(l)(c) is an all-or-nothing
provision both to overshadow the section's lack of clarity
and to outweigh the notion that it should be updated to
reflect modern technological reality.
Section 2(b)
The next step for those advocating Canadian access
to American satellite broadcasts involves a challenge to the
constitutionality of basing restrictions of American broad-
casts on section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. "08
In Canada, Irwin Toy v. Quebec 109 provides the frame-
work for considering arguments based on the freedom of
expression. The first question for analyzing a freedom of
expression case asks whether the activity falls within the
sphere of conduct protected by the freedom of expres-
sion. '0 In Irwin Toy, '' the Supreme Court interpreted
the scope of the freedom of expression broadly, finding
that "[a]ctivity is expressive if it attempts to convey mean-
ing." 112 The Supreme Court added that"most human activ-
ity combines expressive and physical elements," limiting
excluded activity to that which is "purely physical and does
not convey or attempt to convey meaning:" 13 The pro-
tections of section 2(b) also feature content neutrality:
"The content of a statement cannot deprive it of the pro-
tection accorded by section 2(b), no matter how offensive
it may be." 114 Therefore, courts will undertake to deter-
mine whether the activity in question conveys meaning and,
thus, whether it falls within the scope of section 2(b).
Once an activity has been found to fall within
the scope of section 2(b) of the Charter, courts consider
whether the purpose or effect of government action was
to restrict the right. I" If the purpose of the government
action is found to infringe upon the right in question, the
action is invalid. 116
If the government's purpose is to restrict the con-
tent of expression by singling out particular mean-
ings that are not to be conveyed, it necessarily
limits the guarantee of free expression. If the gov-
ernment's purpose is to restrict a form of expres-
sion in order to control access by others to the
meaning being conveyed or to control the ability
of the one conveying the meaning to do so, it also
limits the guarantee. On the other hand, where the
government aims to control only the physical con-
sequences of certain human activity, regardless of
the meaning being conveyed, its purpose is not to
control expression. 117
If a court finds a valid government purpose in the action,
the appellant then bears the burden of demonstrating that
the action effectively restricted the appellant's rights. I8 In
showing the government's actions restricted the freedom
of expression, the appellant must demonstrate that his or
her actions promoted an underlying principle of the free-
dom of expression. As stated above, the Supreme Court
made the following findings regarding these principles:
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"(I) seeking and attaining the truth is an inherently good
activity; (2) participation in social and political decision-
making is to be fostered and encouraged; and (3) the diver-
sity in forms of individual self-fulfillment and human flour-
ishing ought to be cultivated in an essentially tolerant,
indeed welcoming, environment not only for the sake of
those who convey a meaning, but also for the sake of those
to whom it is conveyed." 119 These principals now underlie
the consideration of freedom of expression cases.
While courts broadly interpret the Charter with
regard to protected communications, they also recognize
that section 2(b) protects the rights of listeners. The
Ontario Court of Appeal found the freedom of expression
"[applicable] to all phases of expression from maker or
originator through supplier, distributor, retailer, renter or
exhibitor to receiver, whether as a listener or a viewer." 120
The Supreme Court has additionally recognized that the
protection of expression extends to the listener. 121 Thus,
the freedom of expression extends beyond the conveyer of
expression and includes the right to access expression.
Purpose of Prohibition
The Canadian government has argued that protec-
tion of encrypted signals from theft constitutes the pur-
pose of section 9(I)(c) of the Radiocommunication Act. 122
The government points out that section 9(l)(c) only pro-
hibits the decryption of an "encrypted subscription pro-
gramming signal or encrypted network feed" 23 Thus, if
American broadcasters of satellite programming decided
to broadcast their programming in an unencrypted format,
the Radiocommunication Act would not apply, making it per-
fectly legal for Canadians to access American programming.
The Attorney General of Canada made a submission to this
effect:
It is also relevant to consider that s. 9(l)(c)
is engaged only by a decision on non-governmen-
tal actors to transmit their programming in an
encrypted form. It is not in any sense an attempt
by government itself to restrict access to particu-
lar content, or to prevent members of the public
from having something they are entitled to. Rather,
Parliament has only decided to provide additional
legal support for proprietary rights that exist in
any event. In the absence of this provision, no
one would acquire a right to appropriate the copy-
righted content of the encrypted signals by ruse or
by theft. 124
This statement of purpose, however, oversimplifies the
nature of section 9(l)(c). Canadian Courts have inter-
preted this section in a manner consistent with the Broad-
casting Act and have, in that vein, recognized its purpose
as one to protect Canadian culture and business. Were
the section merely to protect broadcasters choosing to
encrypt their signals, allowing American broadcasters to
enroll Canadian subscribers would pose no problem. But
this is not the case, as the protection of Canadian culture
and business is the rationale behind Canada's broadcasting
regime-rather than the mere protection of encrypted sig-
nals.
Similarly, were the purpose of section 9(1)(c) solely
to protect broadcasters from signal theft, there would be
equally little reason to prohibit Canadians from subscribing
and paying fees to American satellite providers. It seems
evident, then, that the true purpose of section 9(l)(c) is
to limit Canadian access to foreign signals-signals not
regulated by the CRTC. Since the purpose of section
9(I)(c) restricts access to a particular type of content (con-
tent unregulated by the CRTC), it violates the freedom of
expression.
Effect of Prohibition
The effect of the prohibition on accessingAmerican
satellite programming is that section 9(I)(c) limits the free-
dom of expression. As interpreted by the Supreme Court,
section 9(I)(c) prevents Canadians from receiving religious
and foreign language broadcasting when the broadcasters
do not meet CRTC license requirements. 2' In R. v. Leblanc,
Justice Haliburton compared such prohibitions to those of
communist regimes, stating that:
Russia and the Eastern Block countries of Europe
attempted to exclude both radio and television sig-
nals from emanating from the West. Canada par-
ticipated in breaching that electromagnetic wall of
silence by specifically broadcasting to those coun-
tries and others with Radio Canada International
Service of which Canadians are apparently fiercely
proud. I understand that Cuba imposes serious
penalties on citizens who attempt to receive radio
and television signals from international sources.
Such interference is clearly incompatible with freedom
of speech and the freedoms which we have always
taken for granted in this country. 126
The effects of section 9(l)(c) strike at the heart of the
principles underlying the freedom of expression. Access to
multi-lingual foreign programming unavailable in Canada, for
example, is a function of these principles. 127 As mentioned
earlier, Canadian broadcasters currently provide no Span-
ish language channels. 128 American DTH services, how-
ever, offer approximately twenty Spanish channels-includ-
ing channels broadcasting news, sports, and movies from
Latin America. 129
Access to such programming would enable Span-
ish-Canadians to remain in touch with the culture and
events of their homelands. Such access is essential to
the freedom of expression's promotion of attainment of
truth, participation in social and political decision-making,
and allowance for individual self-realization. "' The unavail-
ability of religious programming over Canadian satellite ser-
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vices presents a similar problem. "I' The nature of the reli-
gious and third-language material to which Canadians have
no access falls within the sphere of principles underlying
the freedom of expression. 132 Broad interpretations of
section 2(b) of the Charter and section 9(l)(c) of the Radio-
communication Act, then, stifle the freedom of expression
and its underlying values. Courts must recognize that pro-
hibiting the reception of American satellite signals violates
the freedom of expression-both when the Radiocommuni-
cation Act is interpreted to prohibit decryption, and when
interpreted to prohibit Canadians from subscribing to the
service for a fee.
The protection of expression under section 2(b)
of the Charter, however, is not framed in absolute language.
Section I of the Charter allows for a reasonable limitation
of rights under certain circumstances. 131 In particular, as
a result of the broad interpretation afforded to expression
under section 2(b), section I allows the government to
restrict expression to a certain extent. That is, in contrast
to the American First Amendment "freedom of speech:'
where the definition of "speech" has been expanded
beyond literal "speech," the Canadian
term "expression" in section 2(b) is
itself very broad. Section I of the
Charter, then, has allowed the Supreme
Court of Canada to encourage such
a liberal interpretation of "expression"
under section 2(b). 131
The Supreme Court of Canada
elucidated the requirements for the
abrogation of rights under section I in
the case of P v. Oakes. "I Oakes asked
whether a reverse onus with respect
to a narcotics charge infringed upon
the right to a presumption of innocence under section
I I (d) of the Charter. 13 6 To determine whether section I of
the Charter saved the infringing clause, the Supreme Court
fashioned a test applicable whenever a court considers sec-
tion I of the Charter. '37 Once a court determines that
legislation infringes upon a Charter right, the government
shoulders the burden to justify under section I the limita-
tion placed on the right. '18
Under the Oakes test, two requirements must be
met. First, the objective of the action must be "of sufficient
importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally pro-
tected right or freedom:' '19 Embodying a high compliance
standard, the objective must relate to concerns "which are
pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society
before it can be characterized as sufficiently important." "'
After recognizing a sufficiently significant objective, the gov-
ernment must show the means chosen "are reasonable and
demonstrably justified:' 141
This second requirement involves a proportional-
ity test containing three components. '42 First, "the mea-
sures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the
objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair,
or based on irrational considerations. In other words, they
must be rationally connected to the government's objec-
tive:' " Second, the government action must employ the
least drastic means possible in limiting the protected right. '44
Nearly all section I cases have turned on this prong. 141
The third component requires "proportionality between
the effects of the measures which are responsible for limit-
ing the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which
has been identified as of 'sufficient importance." ' 46 This
condition demands that the effects of the limiting measures
"must not so severely trench on individual or group rights
that the legislative objective, albeit important, is neverthe-
less outweighed by the abridgement of rights." 141 This third
component must also take into account the "proportional-
ity between the deleterious and the salutary effects of the
measures."' 48 Thus, upon discovery of a sufficiently impor-
tant objective, the court will consider whether the law
is rationally connected to the objective, whether the law
impairs the right no more than necessary to complete the
objective, and whether the law has a disproportionately
detrimental effect on those to whom it applies. 14
As already stated, an Oakes analysis focuses on the
"least drastic means" criterion. 1'0 Courts usually defer to
the legislature on the issue of whether a given objective is
sufficiently important to override section I. '' That is, the
courts rarely find that the law is not rationally connected to
the objective. Moreover, the "inquiry into disproportionate
effect is normally, if not always, precluded by the judgment
that the law's objective is sufficiently important to justify
the impact on civil liberties:' 2
Identifying a sufficiently important objective, then,
constitutes the first step in the Oakes analysis. With respect
to the decryption of American satellite broadcasts, the pro-
tection of Canadian culture from erosion by the availability
to Canadian consumers of cheaper American programming
represents one objective of the Canadian legislation. Pro-
tection of the economic sector associated with Canadian
culture represents another objective. 3 These two objec-
tives are relevant as to whether the prohibition exists
on the "pirate" decryption of satellite programming, or
whether the prohibition exists on allowing Canadians
access to American satellites through subscription agree-
ments.
With respect to individuals who modify satellite
access cards without paying subscription fees, there also
exists a pressing need to protect Canadian businesses that
offer satellite service for a fee. While a policy allowing
Canadians to subscribe to American satellite broadcasters
would decrease the subscription base of Canadian satellite
companies, a law allowing Canadians to decrypt American
signals for free would more seriously damage Canadian
businesses since Canadian satellite providers would be
unable to compete with free American service. Allowing
such circumstances to develop would create unfair com-
petition between American and Canadian satellite provid-
ers. The need to protect Canadian culture and business-
combined with the deference that courts afford legislatures
regarding the satisfaction of the first step in the Oakes anal-
ysis-will ensure that a sufficiently important objective in
protecting Canadian culture and businesses exists.
The second part of the Oakes analysis-the pro-
portionality test-consists of three components. '14 The first
component requires a rational connection between the law
and the objective. "I "The essence of a'rational connection'
is a causal rela-
tionship between
the objective of
the law and the
measures enacted
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Canadian businesses offering satellite programming would
lead Parliament to prohibit Canadians from accessing free
satellite programming from the United States. Thus, the
prohibition against Canadian access to encrypted satellite
broadcasts for free without authorization from American
companies who regularly charge a subscription fee for the
service, at the expense of companies obligated to obey
Canadian culture laws, is rationally connected to the objec-
tive. This connection means, then, that the first part of the
Oakes proportionality test has been met. Furthermore,
the proliferation of American programming not subject to
content regulations diverts viewers from Canadian pro-
gramming, thus decreasing the demand for such program-
ming. As a result, prohibiting Canadians from subscribing
to American programming not subject to Canadian content
regulations is also rationally connected to the objective of
protecting Canadian culture and business.
The second part of the Oakes proportionality test
seeks to determine whether section 9(1)(c) of the Radio-
communication Act infringes on the freedom of expression
no more than is necessary to accomplish its objective of
protecting Canadian culture and business. It is here that
section 9(1)(c) fails justification. As discussed above, '
section 9(1)(c) infringes upon section 2(b) of the Charter
because the purpose and effect of the prohibition under-
mine the policy rationales behind the freedom of expres-
sion. "9
Parliament should amend the Radiocommunica-
tion Act to create an offense for the act of decryptngAmer-
ican satellite signals without authorization and payment of





















would protect Canadian businesses by eliminating the free
ride enjoyed by some Canadians with access to American
satellite broadcasts, but would still allow Canadians to
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access American programming through pay subscriptions.
Such an amendment, moreover, should prohibit piracy with-
out depriving Canadians of the freedom to access religious
and third-language programming, as well as other program-
ming not available in Canada. A prohibition preventing
Canadians from subscribing to American satellite services,
however, would not pass the second requirement of the
Oakes proportionality test.
Radio and television signals originating in the United
States are readily accessible to the Canadian public living
in proximity to the American border. Residents of Niagara
Falls,Windsor, and Vancouver have access to radio stations
and television programs originating, respectively, from Buf-
falo, Detroit, and Seattle. No law prohibits the reception
of these unencrypted broadcasts. While Canadian law
currently encourages Canadian business and culture by
imposing requirements on those who broadcast radio and
television signals in Canada, Canadian law does not pro-
hibit Canadian consumers from receiving foreign radio and
non-satellite television signals where technology permits.
With respect to satellite broadcasts in particular, Parlia-
ment should change Canadian law to achieve a similar com-
promise.
The prohibitions on receiving American program-
ming, however, only apply to those broadcasts chosen for
encryption, enabling the broadcaster to charge a fee to
authorize its decryption. If American broadcasters broad-
casted their satellite signals unencrypted, Canadians could
freely view American programming without fear of contra-
vening section 9(I)(c). Allowing Canadians to access Amer-
ican programming through conventional antennae, while
prohibiting access to the same broadcast from encrypted
satellite signals, even where a Canadian resident is willing to
pay the subscription fee, breaches the freedom of expres-
sion more than necessary. There is little reason to protect
the encrypted signal if both the United States broadcaster
and Canadian receiver agree on consensual reception. Such
a provision would not force American satellite companies
to provide service within Canada, but rather would allow
them to offer service to Canadians. Thus, section 9(I)(c) of
the Radiocommunication Act fails the second prong of the
Oakes proportionality test because it limits the freedom of
expression to an extent greater than is necessary to pro-
tect Canadian culture and business.
Proportionality Test -
Proportionality of Objective and Effects
The third component of the proportionality test
requires proportionality between the effects and objective
of the provision. "[T]heir effects [of the limiting provision]
must not so severely trench on individual or group rights
that the legislative objective, albeit important, is neverthe-
less outweighed by the abridgement of rights." 160 The
effects of section 9(I)(c) of the Radiocommunication Act-
prohibiting Canadians from subscribing to American satel-
lite services-outweigh the section's benefits to Canadi-
ans. Prohibiting Canadians from accessing American satel-
lite services limits their ability to access information while
offering minimal protection to Canadian culture. Cana-
dians already have access to unencrypted foreign televi-
sion, radio, and Internet signals. The true threat to Cana-
dian business derives from the unfair competition experi-
enced by Canadian satellite providers that must compete
with free access to American programming. While section
9(I)(c), as interpreted by the courts, protects Canadian
satellite providers by forbidding Canadians from accessing
encrypted American programming, it nevertheless restricts
the freedom of expression more than necessary. Such a
provision, therefore, fails to strike a harmonious balance
between the objective and its effects.
As suggested, however, a provision that prohibits
the circumvention of encrypted satellite broadcasts, while
allowing Canadians to pay for subscriptions to the service,
would be constitutionally acceptable. Such a provision
would accommodate both the objective of protecting Cana-
dian business and the objective of charging Canadians a sub-
scription fee for access to American programming. Cana-
dians, thus, would have access to American programming,
but would have to pay American broadcasters for subscrip-
tions. The ban on accessing foreign satellite signals for free,
meanwhile, would protect domestic satellite providers. The
ultimate result would be the ability of Canadian broadcast-
ers to compete with foreign satellite providers for custom-
ers on a level playing field.
The ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex 161 adversely affected
hundreds of thousands of Canadians owning American
satellite systems, as well as the businesses that provide
such systems. The Supreme Court should not, however,
have performed the duty of Parliament in attempting to
resolve the statutory ambiguity surrounding the reception
of encrypted foreign satellite programming. Instead, Parlia-
ment should reassess the relevant sections of the Radiocom-
munication Act to ensure that it is able to withstand Charter
scrutiny. The current provision breaches the freedom of
expression under section 2(b) of the Charter; moreover,
section I of the Charter fails to save the provision from
causing this breach. Parliament should amend the provision
to prohibit only the decryption of broadcasts where no
subscription fee is paid, regardless of whether the broad-
caster has a CRTC license. Such a legislative scheme
would be consistent with the status quo Canadians cur-
rently enjoy with respect to over-the-air television and
radio broadcasts and unencrypted foreign satellite signals.
This scheme would also maintain an appropriate balance of
rights of those who desire access to foreign programming,
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and domestic businesses concerned with unfair competi-
tion of pirated signals. The Canadian Parliament, therefore,
should implement the legislative changes suggested here to
ensure that the Radiocommunication Act does not violate the
freedom of expression enshrined in the Charter.
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